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Mandatory Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
A Need to Re-Evaluate
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of health care in the United States is a serious problem
facing government. National health care expenditures have captured a
higher percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) every year since
the mid-1960s.' Total U.S. health care expenditures in 1991 accounted
for thirteen percent of the GNP2 - the highest percentage of gross
national product spent on health care by any nation? State government
health care expenditures in the United States average over fourteen percent
of each state's budget.4
Not surprisingly, the cost of obtaining health insurance has also
increased dramatically.5 The growing number of uninsured Americans is
a devastating consequence of the rising cost of medical care that society
must face. In 1987, 15.5% of all Americans were without medical
insurance.6 Most of the uninsureds were working Americans.' The
number of uninsureds rose to 34.7 million in 1990, the highest number
since 1965." The increases in health insurance costs are substantially
impacting the middle class. Families earning over $25,000 per year
accounted for over seventy-five percent of the increase in uninsured
Americans in 1990,' and families earning over $50,000 per year
accounted for over thirty-three percent of the increase.10
1. Frank A. Sloan et al., Finding Solutions to Problems of Access, Quality Assurance,
and Cost Containment, in CosT, QUALITY, AND HEALTH CARE 1, 2 (Frank A. Sloan et al.
eds., 1988).
2. Walter A. Costello, Jr., President Message, MASS. LAW WKLY, June 8, 1992, at 37.
3. STEVEN E. PENGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSmAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALRACTICE 2d § 2:9 at 56 (1992).
4. Michael Tanner, As Washington Dithers, States Reform Health Care, HERITAGE
FOUND. REP., Nov. 27, 1991, at Sec. Backgrounder, No. 868.
5. For a general discussion, see MARY FRANCES CALLEN & DAVID CLARK YEAGER,
CONTAINING THE HEALTH CARE COST SPIRAL (James Bessent, ed. 1991). See also Judith
Graham, Health Care COris: Spiraling Costs Anger Employers in Colorado, U.S., DENVER
POsT, Oct. 1990, at C1.
6. ROBERT P. RHODES, HEALTH CARE POLITICS, POLICY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE:
THE IRONIC TRIUMPH, 254 (1992).
7. Tanner, supra note 4 (Nearly 85% of all Americans without health insurance are
either employed or dependents of an employed person.).
8. Robert Pear, 34.7 Million Lack Health Insurance, Studles Say; Number Is Highest
Since '65, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1991, at B17.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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The facts indicate a serious problem that lawmakers must address.
The concern over the rising cost of medical care is not new, and analysts
have offered many reasons for the increase." Some blame the high cost
of medical malpractice insurance." During his campaign, President
Clinton cited the high cost of physician malpractice insurance as one
conspirator in the health care problem. The President called for
implementing alternative dispute resolution techniques nationwide as a
means of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance. 3
In response to skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance
premiums during the 1970s and 1980s, many states enacted tort reform to
address this perceived crisis. Some of these reforms included: removing
ad dannum clauses (plaintiff's demand for damages), permitting voluntary
arbitration, regulating attorney's fees, abolishing the collateral source rule
(rule prohibiting evidence of plaintiff's recovery for injuries from a party
other than the defendant), increasing penalties for frivolous suits, creating
patient compensation funds (variations on a no-fault system), and
establishing pretrial screening panels. 4  This Comment focuses on
pretrial screening panels when specifically mandated as a precondition to
traditional litigation in medical malpractice cases.
Pretrial medical malpractice screening panels ("screening panels")
have been classified as both arbitration and mediation. Some screening
panels are similar to arbitration because they result in formal decisions by
a third party as to the legal rights and responsibilities of the parties.
However, screening panels more closely resemble mediation because they
are not absolutely binding: They do not necessarily replace traditional
litigation. Nevertheless, mediation may also be a misnomer.'5
Mediation is a proceeding that encourages voluntary settlement. Screening
panels do more. They make qualitative assessments about liability,
thereby acting as a "screen" by separating valid claims from frivolous
11. CALLEN & YEAOER, supra note 5, at 2. Callen lists six reasons for the spiraling
cost of health care: (1) new technology, (2) cost of research and development of new
medicine and diagnostic tools, (3) higher cost of malpractice insurance, (4) minimizing the
possibility of malpractice litigation by documentation and many tests and supporting opinions
[defensive medicine], (5) services provided to uninsured and indigent, and (6) lack of
decision making by patients once in medical provider system. Id.
12. Rep. Charles Stenhom & Rep. John Kyl, Joint News Conference on Health Care
Costs and Malpractice, FED. NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 8, 1991).
13. Bill Clinton, The Cinton Health Care Plan, 327 NEW ENO. J. MED. 804, 806
(1992).
14. For a discussion of these various reforms, see NANCY K. BANNON, AM. MED.
Ass'N., AMA TORT REFORM COMPENDIUM (1989).
15. Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems ith
Definition and Implementation, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoas. 195, 198 (Winter 1991).
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ones. Screening panels also often make quantitative assessments about
liability; 6 however, they vary from state to state. The most salient
features of the different mandatory screening panels are the composition of
the panels and the admissibility of panel findings at a subsequent trial. 7
The overriding legislative purpose behind mandatory screening
panels is to reduce the cost of health care. 8 This Comment considers the
desirability of mandatory screening panels as a means of curbing the
increasing cost of health care. Part I of this Comment questions the
connection between mandatory screening panels and reduced medical care
costs by (1) analyzing how the cost of medical malpractice insurance has
affected the cost of medical care and (2) analyzing how mandatory
screening panels have affected the cost of medical malpractice insurance.
Part II discusses the constitutionality of mandatory screening panels under
state constitutional theories of (1) right to trial by jury, (2) due process,
and (3) equal protection. The issues that underlie the constitutional
analysis are also relevant to the question of the desirability of mandatory
screening panels. Part HI discusses the policy considerations for future
tort reform and analyzes the problems with current mandatory screening
panel procedures.
H. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE AND
MANDATORY SCREENING PANELS
A. The Cost of Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Cost of Medical
Care
Ultimately, the use of mandatory screening panels as a worthy
means of tort reform depends greatly upon the extent that it can help
promote access to health care by making it more affordable. 9 In order
16. BANNON, supra note 14, at 113.
17. See infra Chart A, at app.
18. See Stephen Zuckerman, Informadon on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical
Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (Spring 1986).
19. The United States Department of Health and Human Services listed eight policy
objectives for tort reform: (1) availability of health care; (2) quality of health care; (3)
enhancement of physician-patient relationship; (4) encourage innovation for improved level of
health care; (5) fault as a basis for compensation; (6) prompt resolution and fair
compensation; (7) predictability [of outcomes]; and (8) efficient financial costs, professional
energies, and governmental processes [transaction costs]. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERv., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL LtABILITY AND MALPRACTICE at
17-19 (Aug. 1987).
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to accomplish this goal, the cost of medical malpractice insurance must
have a significant impact on the cost of health care.
The high and increasing cost of medical malpractice insurance has
been blamed as a main contributor to the high cost of both medical care
and health insurance for the past two decades.' Medical malpractice
insurance premiums increased dramatically from 1974 to 1985.21 For
example, the cost of medical malpractice insurance rose from 3.1% of
physicians' gross income in 1982 to 4.6% in 1985.2 However, this
increase peaked in 1987 at 5.6% and fell to 4.8% by 1989. 2 In 1990,
premiums showed declines of five percent to thirty-five percent
nationwide.' Premiums continued to decline slightly in 1991. 2' The
cost of malpractice insurance was reduced even for obstetricians and
neurosurgeons in 1988 and 1989.1 St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company, the largest insurer of liability for physicians and hospitals,
reduced medical malpractice premiums during 1989-90, and it reduced
premiums in 1990 through 1991 by a rate of six percent to twenty-five
percent in twenty-one of the forty-two states in which it operates.' The
nation's largest insurer again announced that it would not raise malpractice
premiums in 1993.1 Despite the halt in increasing costs of medical
malpractice premiums, physician fees are continuing to rise alarmingly. In
1990, physician fees increased fifty percent faster than the consumer price
20. Stenholm & Kyl, supra note 12.
21. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments
and Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 499, 505 (1988-89).
22. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 19, at 13.
23. Martin L. Gonzalez, Medical Professional Liability Claims and Premiurns, 1985-
1991, in SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 36 (American Medical
Association, Center for Health Policy Research, Chicago, 1993).
24. Robert Pear, Insurers Reducing Malpractice Fees for Doctors in U.S., N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 23, 1990, at Al. The reductions have varied among states. For example, in 1990
rates were reduced in Maine by 32%, in Kansas by 25%, in Georgia by 23%, in Minnesota
by 15%, in Colorado by 10% and in Pennsylvania by 6.7% and again by another 15%. Id.
In California, rates declined 37.8% from 1976-1991 when adjusted for inflation. Ruth
Gastel, Medical Malpractice, INs. INFO. INsT. REP., Oct. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Current File.
25. See Gastel, supra note 24.
26. U.S. DEr. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 19, at 166.
27. Malpractice Liability In the United States: Panic Over?, 301 BRIT. MED. J. 949,
949-50 (1990).
28. See Ruth Gastel, Medical Malpractice, INs. INFO. INST. REP., Aug. 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. However, insurers in New York were granted a
fourteen percent average increase effective July 30, 1993; the first increase in four years. Id.
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index.'
The cost of medical malpractice insurance can not be greatly
responsible for the increase in the cost of medical care. During the period
of increase in medical malpractice premiums, the total bill for malpractice
insurance only accounted for 0.9% in 1983 and 1.22% in 1985 of the total
national health care cost.' In 1989, premiums were less than one
percent of the total health care cost and that fell by another four percent in
1991.11 During this most recent decline in the costs of malpractice
insurance, health care costs have "skyrocketed."' Recent data suggests
that the cost of medical malpractice suits, as exhibited through malpractice
premiums, has little effect on the total cost of health care in the United
States.
On the other hand, the cost of malpractice suits may affect the
cost of health care more indirectly, through what is commonly termed
"defensive medicine." The actual cost of defensive medicine may never
be known.' An American Medical Association survey revealed that over
eight out of ten physicians practice defensive medicine.' The American
Medical Association also estimated in 1985 that defensive medicine cost
twelve billion dollars;' however, it is not clear what practices were
included in their definition of defensive medicine.
The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Commission on Medical Malpractice, defined "defensive medicine" as "the
alteration of modes of medical practice, induced by the threat of liability,
for the principal purpose of forestalling the possibility of lawsuits by
patients as well as providing a good and legal defense in the event such
lawsuits are instituted." 3  As defined, defensive medicine only includes
performing procedures not medically justified or omitting medically
beneficial procedures because of the fear of a later malpractice suit? It
does not include alterations in medical practices that may result from fear
of a later malpractice suit but that are also medically justified. Much of
29. Pear, supra note 24, at A26.
30. U.S. DErt. OF H ALTH AND HUMAN SERv., supra note 19, at 175.
31. Costello, supm note 2, at 37.
32. Id.
33. PENOALIs & WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 50.
34. See Gastel, supra note 24.
35. Issues Related to Medical Malpractce: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health,
Committee on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (1990).
36. PENGALIs & WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 49.
37. Id.
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the cost of defensive medicine may be due to a perceived threat that does
not exist. Physician surveys revealed that the overall perceived risk of
being sued was about three times the actual risk.1 Legislators should
question whether these physicians' fears of unwarranted malpractice claims
are legitimate before attempting to reduce the cost of defensive medicine
by reducing the number of malpractice claims.
Malpractice liability is largely based upon a duty to act like a
reasonable physician in like circumstances." Legislators should first ask
whether the duty imposed upon physicians is reasonable or desirable. The
mandatory screening panel is an additional procedure imposed upon
plaintiffs' ability to recover. Such tort reform should not be used to lower
the liability of physicians for breach of their duties to their patients.
The United States Department of Health, recognizing that the
practice of defensive medicine is itself immoral, recommended that
medical organizations exert maximum moral persuasion over physicians
who avoid professional responsibility solely on the fear of malpractice
liability.' However, the perceived "threat of litigation has changed the
doctor-patient relationship into a defensive and adversarial relationship. 41
This alone is a serious problem facing society. Legislators must decide
whether physician liability should be removed to help calm the fears of
physicians or whether other methods of tort reform may reduce the cost of
defensive medicine. Most importantly, any tort reforms that are enacted
should attempt to bring back mutual respect to the doctor-patient
relationship.
B. Mandatory Screening Panels and the Cost of Medical Malpractice
Insurance
Four factors commonly cited as responsible for cost increases in
medical malpractice insurance are: (1) an increase in loss payments
(claims paid), (2) excessive insurance company profits, (3) attributes of the
insurance industry underwriting cycle, and (4) the insurance risk
38. HARvARD MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOcTORs, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACrICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEw YORK
9 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530 (Colo. 1993).
40. PENoALs & WACHsMAN, supra note 3, at 51.
41. Tom Cameron, LI Health Care: Where Do We Begin?, LI BUs. NEWS, May 16,
1991, at 5H.
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classification system.' The driving rationale behind the support for
mandatory screening panels is their ability to "screen" out meritless
claims, thereby helping to reduce the amount of claims paid. Mandatory
screening panels are intended to resolve medical malpractice disputes more
efficiently than traditional litigation, thereby saving transaction costs and
ultimately the cost of loss payments.' This section will focus on the
increase in loss payments because it is the one factor that mandatory
screening panels are designed to impact most directly.
Assuming mandatory screening panels are able to reduce the
number of medical malpractice claims, a correlation between reduced
numbers of claims filed and paid, and reduced cost of malpractice
insurance must exist in order for mandatory screening panels to
accomplish their purpose. The number of medical malpractice claims filed
and the cost of medical malpractice insurance both rose during the 1970s
and 1980s.' However, the trend has reversed in recent years. The
number of malpractice claims filed has been on the decline since 1985.
In 1988, the rate of increase in the cost of medical malpractice insurance
premiums began to fall, and beginning in 1989 the actual cost of premiums
began to fall.' Insurers have not been able to explain which combination
42. David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of
Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. LJ. 1495, 1511 (1988). Much has
been written blaming either the insurance industry or the increases in malpractice insurance
premiums. See Issues Related to Medical Malpractice, supra note 35, at 26. This Comment
is not intended to conclude this debate. Some authority exists for assuming that excessive
insurance profits have contributed to the cost of medical malpractice. See PENGAus &
WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 53 (study by the Commissioner of Minnesota Department of
Commerce finding that between 1982-87 insurers charged rates which were considerably
more than necessary to cover losses and expenses and also realize a healthy profit); Costello,
supra note 2, at 37; Pear, supra note 24, at Al. Assuming both excessive insurance profits
and increasing claim costs had some effect on increasing premiums through the 1980s, this
Comment's scope is limited to addressing the extent claim frequency, severity, and
subsequent tort reforms have affected medical malpractice premiums.
43. See, e.g., Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Neb. 1977).
44. Bovbjerg, supra note 21, at 505-06.
45. Malpractice Liability In the United States: Panic Over?, supra note 27, at 949.
Figures released in 1990 by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the largest insurer
of liability for physicians and hospitals, showed that the number of claims filed dropped
every year from 1985 through 1990. Issues Related to Medical Malpractice, supra note 35,
at 166; see also Gastel, supra note 28. While the number of claims has fallen nationwide,
individual states may see increases in 1993; for example, New York experienced a slight
increase in 1992-93. Moreover, the rate of claims filed varies drastically between specialties;
for example, the rate of claims filed against obstetricians and gynecologists has increased by
seventy-one percent over the past five years. Gastel, supra note 28.
46. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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of social, legal, and economic factors has allowed the reductions.'
The apparent correlation between the reduced number of claims
paid and the reduced cost of malpractice insurance may, however, be
illusory. There was a sharp drop in the number of malpractice claims
filed in Massachusetts through mid-1992; nonetheless, the Joint
Underwriting Association filed for a fourteen percent increase in premiums
in Massachusetts for 1993.' Premiums for obstetricians went down
while the number of claims filed against them rose.' Additionally,
evidence compiled by Frank A. Sloan during the 1980s led to the
conclusion that the size and frequency of claims paid are only weakly
related to premium increases.' Mandatory screening panels may reduce
the cost of malpractice insurance not only by reducing the number of
insurance claims paid but also by reducing the transaction costs of
malpractice litigation. However, the evidence from court records suggests
that mandatory screening panels have had little success in resolving
disputes faster and cheaper than traditional litigation. In its first four
years of operation, the mandatory screening panel in Rhode Island
resolved only 57 of the 266 controversies brought before it; 209
controversies remained unresolved.5' The legislature of Rhode Island
responded by overhauling the system, making it more akin to a formal
pretrial conference. 2  A study of Wisconsin's mandatory screening
panels found that over seventy percent of all claims ended up starting
traditional litigationP The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found their
mandatory screening panel to be unconstitutional due to its inability to
effectuate its legislative purpose of providing a prompt determination of
claims.' During the operation of the mandatory screening panels in
Pennsylvania between April 1976 and December 1979, 2,909 claims were
filed with the administrator but only 134 were actually given certificates of
readiness to begin screening panel proceedings.-" Of these 134 cases, 14
were tried before the screening panels, 23 were settled during panel
selection process, and one was continued per court order; 96 of the 134
47. Malpractice Liability in the United States: Panic Over?, supra note 27, at 950.
48. See Gastel, supra note 24.
49. Gastel, supra note 28.
50. Frank A. Sloan, Responses to the Malpractice Insurance 'Crisis of the 1970s: An
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. OF HEALTH, POL., POL'Y. & L. 629, 643 (1985).
51. Boucherv. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 89 (R.I. 1983).
52. Id. at 89-90.
53. Meschievitz, supra note 15, at 211.
54. Mattes v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 193-94 (Pa. 1980).
55. Id. at 194.
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cases had not yet been decided by the screening panels. 6
Other reasons for the reduction in medical malpractice premiums
have been suggested. In addition to the reversal of the insurance
companies' policies of setting premiums higher than needed,' increased
competition in the insurance industry has been noted as causing premium
reductions.' The Vice President of the American Medical Association
cited an increase in the use of physician-owned insurance companies that
"generally do not work to make a profit" as a reason for the decline.O
Moreover, the Massachusetts Medical Society cited heightened efforts by
physicians at risk management and improved quality of care as the
principal reasons for the reduced premiums.' One study found that the
three tort reforms that have had the greatest impact on the cost of
premiums were: (1) abolition of the collateral source rule, (2) shorter
statutes of limitations, and (3) caps on damages (primarily pain and
suffering)." The evidence suggests that mandatory screening panels have
not been an effective method of tort reform to reduce the cost of medical
malpractice insurance.
The connection between the cost of medical malpractice insurance
and the cost of health care is tenuous at best. If the purpose of mandatory
screening panels is to help reduce the cost of medical care by reducing the
cost of medical malpractice insurance, then the rationale for mandating the
use of screening panels should be re-evaluated. If screening panels are
unable to dispose of claims more quickly and less expensively than
traditional litigation, then their only benefit accrues to defendants who
have gained the protection of another layer of time and bureaucracy. In
such a situation, "[iut cannot seriously be contended that the extension of
special benefits to the medical profession and the imposition of an
additional hurdle in the path of medical malpractice victims relate to the
protection of the public health."'
56. Id.
57. See PENGAUS & WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 53; Pear, supra note 24, at Al.
58. Pear, supra note 24, at Al.
59. Id.
60. See Gastel, supra note 24.
61. Issues Related to Medical Malpractice, supra note 35, at 17. Note the absence of
mandatory screening panels. Compare Sloan, supra note 50, at 640 (The existence of both
mandatory and voluntary screening panels show a negative impact on cost of premiums.).
62. Hoemv. State, 756 P.2d 780, 783 (Wyo. 1988).
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lIH. CONST1TUTIONALrrY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SCREENING PANELS
The mandatory use of pre-trial screening panels has been attacked
under several state and federal constitutional theories in many
jurisdictions.' The majority of courts have upheld the constitutionality
of mandatory screening panels. However, some courts have found them
either unwise or outright unconstitutional.' As these tort reform
measures enjoy longer periods of utilization, their effectiveness in reducing
the cost of medical malpractice insurance and, ultimately, the cost of
health care becomes increasingly important not only for court analysis, but
also for legislative analysis and public debate.
Mandatory screening panels have been challenged most often
under the following state constitutional theories: (1) the right to trial by
jury, (2) substantive due process, and (3) equal protection. The most
common determinative factor among the three is the balancing of the
burden on individual litigant's rights and the benefits to society at large.65
As discussed earlier, the overriding impetus behind legislative mandating
of screening panels is to control spiraling medical care costs.' The
preceding section examined the possible effect screening panels may have
on the cost of medical care. This section will examine some of the
constitutional and policy considerations that must be balanced against the
effectiveness of mandatory screening panels in dealing with the medical
care "crisis."
A. Right to Trial By Juiy
The mandatory use of pretrial screening panels has been attacked
in many jurisdictions as an infringement upon the fundamental right to a
jury trial.' The Federal Constitution has been construed not to provide a
right to a jury trial in state civil claim cases.' However, many state
constitutions provide an explicit right to a jury trial in both criminal and
63. See infra Chart B, at app.
64. See infra Chart B, at app.
65. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Mattos v.
Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
66. Stenholm & Kyl, supra note 12; Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (Ariz.
1977); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 589-94 (Ind. 1980); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 71 (Md.
1978); State ev rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 442 (Wis. 1978).
67. See infra Chart B, at app.
68. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
MANDATORY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SCREENING PANELS
civil trials.' Mandatory screening panels have been challenged as
violations of the right to a jury trial predominately under two theories: (1)
Submission of the panel conclusions at the jury trial unduly impairs the
ability of the jury to decide all issues of fact de novo; and (2) increased
cost of submitting the case to the panel unduly burdens the litigant's right
to present the case to a jury.
1. Impairment of De Novo Jury Trial
The challenge that mandatory screening panels unduly impair the
ability of the jury to decide the issues of fact, in violation of the state right
to a trial by jury, has been largely unsuccessful". Clearly, in those
jurisdictions where the conclusions of the panel are not admissible in the
subsequent trial,7 no infringement upon the jury's determination of fact
exists. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of their
screening panel on the condition that the conclusions of the panel not be
admissible in the subsequent trial, thereby guaranteeing a trial de novo 2
Where admission of the panel conclusions is allowed, the constitutionality
of the admission has usually been upheld under the theory of legislative
discretion to formulate rules of evidence. The most extreme case is
Attorney General of Maryland v. Johnson.' Under Maryland's provision
for mandatory screening panels, the conclusions of the panel are not only
admissible but also presumed correct. The Maryland Court of Appeals
upheld the presumption of correctness as a prerogative of the legislature
and the courts to formulate and decide upon the admissibility of
evidence.' 4
Jurisdictions have found the admissibility of panel conclusions to
be constitutional for conflicting reasons. The Supreme Courts of Arizona
and Wisconsin found that because panel members may not be called as
witnesses at the subsequent trial, any prejudicial effect upon the jury is
69. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736, 740 (Ill.
1976) (In Illinois, the constitution provides, "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed
shall remain inviolate." ILL. CONST., art. I, § 13).
70. The most popular case finding mandatory screening panels unconstitutional under
this theory is Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. 1976).
However, this case has not been persuasive. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d
57, 67 (Md. 1978).
71. See infra Chart A, at app.
72. See Firelock, Inc. v. McGhee Comm., Inc., 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).
73. 385 A.2d 57 (Md. 1978).
74. Id. at 79.
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contained and therefore its admissibility does not infringe upon the right to
a jury trial.' Conversely, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
either party must be allowed to cross-examine panel members at trial as to
credibility and possible bias in order for the screening panels to be
constitutional.' The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the ability to
call any panel member as a witness at trial was essential in providing an
acceptable forum for a litigant to have the facts determined by the jury de
novo. The New York Court of Appeals and the Alaska Supreme Court
made similar holdings.' On the other hand, the Maryland statute does
not allow panel members to be witnesses at trial; nor does it allow the jury
to consider whether the panel conclusion was influenced by fraud,
partiality, or the like.' The Maryland Court of Appeals held that this
fact "has no relevance whatever to whether the parties receive that to
which they are entitled - a de nova jury trial of the malpractice claim."'
In Maryland, the inability to challenge the panel members' credibility on
the witness stand removes the attribute that the New Jersey, Louisiana,
and New York courts found necessary - cross-examining the panel
members at trial. Moreover, the presumption in Maryland is that the
panel's conclusions are correct. This presumption removes the very
attribute of avoiding the undue influence on the jury's de novo review that
Arizona's and Wisconsin's rules against panel member testimony seek to
insure. For these reasons, the Maryland system is unique. These
contradictory holdings weaken the persuasiveness of treating the admission
of mandatory screening panels' conclusions as simply rules concerning
"expert" testimony.
75. Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 749 (Ariz. 1977); State ar rel. Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 450 (Wis. 1978).
76. Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 436 (NJ. 1983).
77. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1264 (La. 1978); see also Galloway v. Baton
Rouge Gen. Hosp., 602 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (La. 1992).
78. Comiskey v. Arlen, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (1976); Keyes v. Humana Hosp.
Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 355 (Alaska 1988); Treyball v. Clark, 483 N.E.2d 1136, 1137
(N.Y. 1985).
79. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 3-2A-06(c),(e) (1992); see also Attorney
Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 67 (Md. 1978).
80. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 70 (Md. 1978).
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2. Undue Burden
Challenging mandatory screening panels under the theory that the
increased costs incurred therein are an unreasonable burden upon the right
to a jury trial has had limited success." The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the increased cost and delay of screening panels
were unjustified burdens upon litigants in medical malpractice cases and,
therefore, violated the right to a jury trial under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.' The Pennsylvania court found the mandatory use of
screening panels unconstitutional only two years after finding the same
provision constitutional.' In the first case, Parker v. Children's Hospital
of Philadelphia, the court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution "does not
require an absolutely unfettered right to a jury trial."" Most courts have
interpreted the analogous language of other state constitutions to contain
similar limitations.' The Pennsylvania court held in Parker that
arbitration as a condition precedent to trial was not a per se violation of
the right to a jury trial." Two years later, however, the court in Mattos
v. Thompson held that during the interim the panels had proven unable to
effectuate the legislative purpose of swift adjudication of claims at a
minimal cost.' The court found that because the statute mandating
screening panels no longer reasonably effectuated the compelling state
interest, it violated the constitutional right to a jury trialA8 Other courts
have also seriously questioned the effectiveness of screening panels to
control the cost of malpractice insurance and health care." However,
most courts have declined to seriously consider the legislative wisdom in
81. See Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); see also Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. 1976).
82. Mauos, 421 A.2d at 196.
83. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 394 A.2d 932, 938 (Pa. 1978).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., State tu rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 449 (Wis. 1978).
86. Parker, 394 A.2d at 938.
87. Manos, 421 A.2d at 195.
88. Id. at 193. (Note that the Court found the screening panels unable to help the
medical care crisis. The cost of malpractice insurance was still continuing to rise at this
time, and therefore, the state's interest in reducing the cost was presumably still
compelling.).
89. See Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); see also Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d
780 (Wyo. 1988).
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mandating screening panels under the tight to jury theory.'
B. Substantive Due Process
Due process clauses in state constitutions often include specific
"access to courts" provisions for civil suits.9  Mandatory screening
panels have been attacked as unduly prohibiting access to the courts in
violation of state due process clauses. In no state has mandatory, binding
screening panels, or other arbitration proceedings been a prerequisite to a
court hearing in a medical malpractice suit. It is the postponement of the
right to access to the courts that screening panels create that becomes the
focus of constitutional analysis.' As is the case with the right to trial by
jury, the added expense of the screening panels has been claimed to be
unduly burdensome on the right to access to the courts in violation of due
process." However, the right to access to the courts has never been
without restriction. Legislatures are free to restrict access to the courts if
such restriction is reasonable to effectuate a legitimate state purpose.' A
balancing test must be used similar to that used in the right to jury trial
theory. Most courts that have addressed this issue have utilized a low
level of scrutiny." The Missouri Supreme Court, however, interpreted
the right of access to the courts to be fundamental and, by implication,
used strict scrutiny to .find the mandatory screening panel
unconstitutional.' Most legislatures have imposed mandatory screening
panels to curb the rising cost of malpractice insurance.' If screening
panels are rationally related to this purpose, then, under low-level
scrutiny, they will not violate a plaintiff's right to access to the courts.
In addition to challenges under "access to courts" provisions,
mandatory screening panels have also been attacked as violations of due
process on the theory that they change the common law right of redress
90. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586, 590 (Ohio 1981); see also infra
Chart B, at app.
91. See, e.g., IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 12 (amended 1984).
92. See, e.g., Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 193 (Pa. 1980).
93. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (Ind. 1980).
94. Id. at 594; see also State cr rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444 (Wis.
1978).
95. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d
1187, 1191 (Mont. 1981).
96. State cr rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979).
97. See Zuckerman, supra note 18.
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for medical negligence. Courts have consistently rejected this theory.'
As the Indiana Supreme Court noted in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital,
"(t]he relationship of health care provider and patient imposes . . . a
common law legal duty. The nature and extent of that duty may be
modified by legislation. Hence, the Legislature may also validly act to
restrict the remedy available for breach of that duty.' Based on the
resistance of courts to adopt this theory in the past, it appears unlikely that
mandatory screening panels will be found unconstitutional under this
theory of due process at any time in the near future.
C. Equal Protection
The balancing test used in right to trial by jury and due process
theories is similar to the low level scrutiny test used in equal protection
analysis. Attacks on mandatory screening panels have commonly arisen
under equal protection analysis." Legislatures have singled out medical
malpractice suits for mandatory screening panels. This differential
treatment from other torts is subject to equal protection analysis. The
appropriate level of scrutiny is a question of law that varies from state to
state."' Most states utilize low-level scrutiny to analyze the impact of
mandatory screening panels."
Low-level scrutiny may be generalized as requiring legislation to
be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest." This is a two-part
analysis. First, the state interest that the legislation is attempting to
protect (the "end") must be legitimate. Second, the method that the
legislature has employed to effectuate that purpose (the "means") must be
reasonable. Therefore, mandatory screening panels in medical malpractice
cases must be rationally related to reducing the cost of health care
(assuming that reducing the cost of health care is a legitimate state
interest). States using low-level scrutiny have consistently upheld the
constitutionality of mandatory screening panels under equal protection
analysis."°  Rhode Island and Wyoming, however, have found
98. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hasp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (Ind. 1980); Prendergrast
v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-64 (Neb. 1977).
99. St. Vmcent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 594.
100. See infra Chart B, at app.
101. An excellent overview of the traditional levels of scrutiny used in equal protection
analysis can be found in Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 91 (R.I. 1983).
102. See, e.g., Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-92 (Ohio 1981).
103. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1927).
104. Beatry, 424 N.E.2d at 594.
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mandatory screening panels to be unconstitutional using low-level equal
protection analysis."°5
In Maryland, where the most radical form of mandatory screening
panels is used, the Maryland Court of Appeals employed a higher level of
scrutiny but upheld the constitutionality of mandatory screening panels for
medical malpractice tortsY°6 A higher level of scrutiny is used when
either a suspect classification or a fundamental right is adversely
affected."°7 Screening panels will be analyzed under a higher level of
scrutiny if either the medical malpractice plaintiff or the medical
malpractice defendant constitutes a "suspect class." Most courts have been
unwilling to categorize the classification of medical malpractice plaintiffs
or defendants as "suspect.""s However, Louisiana did find that medical
malpractice litigants were a suspect class: "Because the Act 'constitutes a
special legislation provision in derogation of general rights available to tort
victims' it must be strictly construed.""0
Screening panels will also be analyzed under a higher level of
scrutiny if they negatively affect a fundamental right. The right to access
to the courts and the right to a jury trial have been found to be such
fundamental rights. 10 States such as Missouri, where screening panels
have been found to violate the fundamental right to access to the courts,
and Ilinois, where screening panels were found to violate the fundamental
right to a jury trial, would probably have utilized strict scrutiny under
equal protection analysis had such analysis been necessary.
The interrelationship between the right to jury trial, due process,
and equal protection is important when analyzing mandatory screening
panels. Equal protection analysis depends greatly upon the determination
of whether the right to jury trial or an aspect of due process ("access to
courts") is a fundamental right. In addition, the right to jury trial and due
process often utilize the same analysis as that used under equal protection.
In all three areas of constitutional analysis, the issue of deference
to the legislature is often the underlying consideration. The higher the
level of scrutiny used by the court, the lower the amount of deference
afforded the legislative determination. The final determination as to
105. Boucher, 459 A.2d at 93; Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 782 (Wyo. 1988).
106. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 77-78 (Md. 1978) (statute passing
intermediate standard of "means-focused" test requires substantial relation).
107. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hoasp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (Ind. 1980).
108. See, e.g., State v. Senno, 398 A.2d 873, 878 (NJ. 1979).
109. Galloway v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hasp., 602 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (La. 1992) (quoting
Head v. Erath Gen. Hosp., 458 So. 2d 579, 581-82 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
110. State cc rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979).
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constitutionality will depend upon the deference given to the legislatures'
determinations that a heath care crisis exists and that screening panels will
help solve this crisis.
Recently, in Hoem v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court
declined to give the legislature the sweeping deference often given by
courts who considered mandatory screening panels in the past."' The
court criticized giving legislatures too much deference:
Most state courts give considerable deference to the state
legislatures' specific declarations in statutes that such a crisis
does exist and that the substantive portions of the statute are
intended to alleviate that crisis. A better approach for those
courts that have yet to decide the issue would be, however, to
take a more skeptical attitude toward the evidence presented by
the medical profession and the insurance industry and toward
the conclusion reached by the state legislature regarding the
existence of a crisis . . . Proper scrutiny of the constitutional
validity of state legislation demands more than a perfunctory
deferral to the legislature's conclusions regarding the existence
of a health care crisis in the particular state.
112
Because the evidence suggests that: (1) the cost of medical malpractice
premiums has declined;"1 3 (2) the size and frequency of medical
malpractice claims have little effect on the cost of malpractice
insurance;"14  and (3) the cost of medical malpractice insurance
contributes only slightly to the cost of health care,"' the Wyoming
Supreme Court's approach is persuasive. The courts are the final
protectors of individual plaintiffs' and defendants' rights. Courts should
not shrink from their duty to protect the minority behind a vague notion of
deference to legislatures, especially in an area of traditional judicial
cognizance, namely the right of injured individuals to seek redress in the
courts.
111. Hoerv. State, 756 P.2d 780, 784 (Wyo. 1988).
112. rd. (quoting Comment, Consdtudonal Challenges to Medical Malpracice Review
Boards, 46 TENN. L. REv. 607, 645 (1978)).
113. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
114. See Sloan, supra note 50, at 643; see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.
115. See supra part H(A).
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts have found mandatory screening panels to be
constitutional, to be unconstitutional, and to reach "the outer limits of
constitutional tolerance."" 6  A battleground for abandonment or
implementation of mandatory screening panels also exists in the state
legislatures." 7 If Congress enters the arena of tort reform, as indicated
by a recent bill introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), then this battle
will certainly intensify.118 Moreover, the President has indicated that
tort reform will be a priority in his health care reform package." 9 The
United States Department of Health and Human Services published a list
of policy objectives for tort reform in the area of medical malpractice."n
The following were the top three objectives: (1) to assure the availability
of health care, (2) to increase the quality of care, and (3) to enhance the
physician-patient relationship.
As the cost of health care increases, the availability decreases.
Part II of this Comment analyzed the effectiveness of mandatory screening
panels in reducing the cost of health care. The evidence suggests that
mandatory screening panels have little effect on the cost of health care.
Moreover, despite the cost of medical malpractice insurance, physician
entry into the market has not been barred. The ratio of physicians per
100,000 individuals in the United States increased from 211 in 1980 to 252
in 1987,1 a time period which experienced increases in malpractice
insurance premiums.12  Consequently, it is unlikely that malpractice
premiums significantly deter the entry of new physicians, especially in
light of the recent premium reductions.
The primary purpose of the tort system is to provide
compensation to individuals who have been wrongly injured according to
society's standards. Assuring the availability of health care is not the
province of the tort system. The focus of tort reform should concentrate
more heavily on: (1) providing fair and prompt compensation to injured
patients, (2) improving the quality of care, and (3) enhancing the
physician-patient relationship.
116. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976).
117. The Vermont Legislature recently changed their screening panel from a voluntary
one to a mandatory one. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 46 (1992).
118. Stenholm&Kyl, supra note 12.
119. Clinton, supra note 13 at 806.
120. U.S. DEr. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 19, at 166.
121. RHODES, supra note 6, at 217.
122. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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A. Providing Fair and Prompt Compensation to Injured Patients
Studies show that our current system provides compensation only
to a small proportion of those patients injured as a result of medical
malpractice." The purpose of the screening panel should shift from
"screening" out what it considers frivolous or meritless claims to
facilitating the voluntary settlement of disputes. The function of
determining the facts of the underlying claim should be left to traditional
litigation.
Formal panel conclusions on liability that are admissible at trial
tread upon the functions of the judge and jury. The judge and jury are the
fundamental components of our judicial system. When the state operates
to judge the relationship between private citizens through the judicial
system, our society has determined that finding the truth is the ultimate
responsibility of a fact finder in court. To ensure the finding of truth, our
system has developed as an adversarial one. Presumably, that is why
current screening panels are more adversarial than traditional voluntary,
nonbinding mediation. However, the fair operation of an adversarial
procedure necessitates the use of the Rules of Evidence. Many of the
current mandatory screening panels do not operate under these rules. For
example, Michigan's screening panel is not required to follow the Rules of
Evidence. Moreover, neither party is permitted to be heard by the panel
in making its determination of liability. "
While the conclusions of the screening panels are not absolutely
binding upon the parties, they do significantly affect the parties' interests.
Many states require the party that petitions a trial court from a screening
panel decision to post a bond to the court. This bond is then used to pay
the costs of the opposing party if the panel award is not substantially
modified at trial. Moreover, many states allow the panel conclusions to be
admitted at trial as "expert testimony" but do not allow cross-examinations
of the panel members at trial."z  This removes the long established
principle of cross-examination essential to the confrontation clause.
The Rules of Evidence and other "formalities" of traditional
litigation are present to ensure the finding of the truth. Mandatory
screening panels operate as finders of fact without the safeguards
developed over hundreds of years of experience in our American legal
123. Issues Related to Medical Malpractice, supra note 35, at 9 (statement of Charles A.
Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States).
124. MiCH. COMP. LAws § 600.4913, ch. 49 (1992).
125. See infra Chart A, at app.
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system. For this reason, the current functions of mandatory screening
panels operate to deprive parties to medical malpractice cases of the right
to a fair and honest resolution of their claims and, therefore, are
illegitimate.
Unfortunately, our traditional system has failed to provide a
reliable avenue for reimbursement of injuries for negligence, reducing the
deterrent effect of monetary damages. In the State of New York in 1984,
eight times as many patients had an injury from malpractice as filed
claims, and sixteen times as many patients suffered injury from negligence
as received compensation. 1 6  Screening panels and similar nonbinding
arbitration may be good methods for making the system of compensation
more accessible to patients with legitimate malpractice claims. However,
evidence like that found by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mattos v.
Thompson,' 7 where screening panels only delayed resolution of claims
and added to their expense, suggests that screening panels may not be the
best answer.
A radical solution to this problem is setting up a no-fault
compensation system much like workers compensation systems. This has
the advantage of a quid pro quo. Plaintiffs sacrifice the opportunity for
full compensation for intangibles like pain and suffering while physicians
must pay for injuries not resulting from negligence or willful conduct.
One major advantage of this system would be that plaintiffs would not
have to wait long to receive compensation. Likewise, physicians would
not have to be tied up in protracted legal battles, presumably freeing their
consciences from anger at the patients. The physician-patient relationship
would likely benefit.
One negative side effect of a no-fault system is the removal of the
tort system from the quality control network. In order for the no-fault
system to be attractive, other institutions like physician peer groups and
government agencies would have to increase controls over quality care. In
addition, implementation of a no-fault compensation system in medical
injury cases would have to pass equal protection analysis. The disparate
treatment of medical injury in this instance from other torts is apparent.
Implementing a no-fault system requires a revolution in American
thinking. Americans feel that a person who negligently injures another
should have to pay all resulting damages, including those like "pain and
suffering." This is at the heart of American common law torts. As a
result, nationwide no-fault medical injury systems may not be forthcoming.
126. HARVARD MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STUDY, supra note 38, at 6.
127. Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980).
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B. Improving the Quality of Care
A committee of the Association of the Bar of New York City,
which was well-represented by hospital and insurance professionals as well
as defense advocates, recently studied the existence of the "insurance
crisis" and concluded that "improving the quality of health, not further
restricting the ability of injured plaintiff's to sue," is where New York
should place its primary focus." The quality of health care in the U.S.
has been less than optimal. In 1990, infant mortality rates were higher per
capita in the United States than in Belgium, France, England, West
Germany, and Sweden." 9 The rate of death in the United States from
infectious and parasitic diseases in 1990 was twice that of Belgium,
Sweden, and West Germany, and three times as much as England.1"
The tort system has traditionally been a source of help in the
improvement of the quality of health care in the United States. William F.
Minogue, Medical Director at the George Washington University Medical
Center, said, "[malpractice litigation] has produced the very case law that
has been such a powerful and legitimate motivator for change in
hospitals."' 3' The tort system should continue to be one method of
spotting negligent physicians. The Editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine estimated that in 1985 at least five percent of all physicians
should not have been practicing medicine." It is estimated that one
percent of all physicians are negligent each year.133 State medical
boards, however, take action against about only 0.5% of the nation's
physicians each year."3  Moreover, most of this action is not taken for
negligent practice but for drug abuse and the sale of illegal drugs."
The threat of liability continues to be a motivator for quality control. The
Journal of the American Medical Association found that physician-owned
insurance companies, which are financially motivated to prevent medical
negligence, were weeding out negligent physicians faster than state medical
128. PENGAuS & WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 54 (quoting THE RECORD OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORIK, Vol. 45, No. 5, at 573 (June 1990)).
129. TIMOTHY S. JOST, ASSURING THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACncE: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATVE STUDY 70 (1990).
130. Id.
131. PENGALIs & WACHSMAN, supra note 3, at 56.
132. See Gastel, supra note 24.
133. HARVARD MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STUDY, supra note 38, at 3; see also Issues
Related to Medical Malpractice, supra note 35, at 8.
134. Issues Related to Medical Malpractice, supra note 35, at 6.
135. Id.
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boards.'3 Tort reform that simply creates barriers to bringing valid
negligence suits frustrates the needed deterrent value our tort system
should provide.
C. Enhancing the Physician-Patient Relationship
"Threat of litigation has changed the doctor-patient relationship
into a defensive and adversarial relationship."'" Before the enactment
of any tort reforms, legislators should consider the effect upon the
physician-patient relationship. Traditional litigation is formal and
adversarial. It has created hostility and fear between physicians and
patients. However, the screening panel is also an adversarial process.
The adversarial nature of claim resolution translates into a defensive and
adversarial relationship between physician and patient."3
The screening panel procedure can be modified to help protect the
physician-patient relationship by ensuring confidentiality. Admitting the
record and conclusions of the screening panel at a subsequent trial forces
the panel proceedings to be more adversarial. Physicians are legitimately
concerned about the effect malpractice claims have upon the reputation of
their practices. The overreaction of physicians practicing defensive
medicine may largely be explained by the aversion physicians have to
having a public claim for negligence reach the courthouse. Settlement in a
structured proceeding is much more likely to occur if physicians are free
from fear of the retaliation, increased insurance cost, and investigation'"
attendant to public proceedings. Moreover, since a de novo trial is
constitutionally required, admission of the panel conclusion has little value.
The parties are still likely to use key expert witnesses at trial. The value
of admitting the conclusions of the screening panel is outweighed by the
burden it places on settlement between parties who could then leave the
process without resentment.
D. Future Use of the Screening Panel
Despite the major shortcomings of the mandatory screening panel,
some useful notions can be salvaged. The active participation of neutral
experts in a structured mediation is an asset that should be maintained by
the state. Furthermore, participation in such a process greatly facilitates
136. See Gastel, supra note 24.
137. Cameron, supra note 41, at 5H.
138. Id.
139. Meschievitz, supra note 15, at 200-01.
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discovery of relevant information ' that is useful in settlement
negotiations. Most importantly, such a mediation process should garner
respect from both the medical profession and the public. Such respect can
only be earned, however, by providing a system that is both fair and
efficient. Effective alternative dispute resolution can only be achieved if
the parties to the proceeding have confidence in the fairness of the system.
Because experience has shown that the only fair way for the state
to impose a solution on the parties is through the formal fact-finding
procedure of traditional litigation, any mandatory mediation should be
nonbinding and have no effect on the rights of unwilling parties. The
mandatory mediation should facilitate voluntary settlement through a
conciliatory atmosphere. To avoid igniting already adverse interests,
proceedings should be confidential. Trust from the parties that the
alternative dispute resolution is fair is essential.
A good mediation panel would be chaired by a professional
mediator who would have control over the proceedings. Professional
mediators are useful in keeping the proceedings amicable. Promoting
settlement between hostile interests is no easy task. The worse the parties'
relationship, the dimmer the chance mediation will be successful. 4'
Why shouldn't professionals be utilized to tackle such an obstacle?
Each side should be allowed to participate equally in the choice of
the qualified experts who will serve on the mediation panel. Many states
do not afford the parties any choice in the mandatory screening panel
membership."4  In addition, no legal professionals are needed on the
mediation panel. Each party should be represented by legal counsel.
Additional legal professionals on the panel only intensify the impression
that a formal legal judgment is being rendered. If this is not the case,
why are judges and lawyers needed on the panel? The most important
feature of the mediation panel should be its purpose in facilitating an
amicable, fair solution to the parties' dispute in a more cost efficient
manner. If this is not accomplished, parties should be free to move on to
traditional litigation without any prejudice from their attempt to reach an
earlier settlement.
140. Johnsonv. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. 1980).
141. Rhonda G. Parker, Mediation: A Social Exchange Framework, MEDIATION Q.,
Fall 1991-92, at 121-133.
142. See infra Chart A, at app.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the cost of health care is certainly a major problem
facing America, it does not appear that the cost of medical malpractice
insurance is a significant factor. Moreover, the mandatory screening panel
has not been able to prove itself successful in reducing the cost of medical
malpractice insurance. This connection is essential to the effectiveness of
mandatory screening panels in resolving the "health care crisis."
Mandatory screening panels deny parties long established individual rights
reaching, if not exceeding, the limits of constitutional protection. These
individual rights should not be sacrificed in the name of the public health
without certainty that they are necessary. States should re-evaluate their
mandatory screening panels and modify their purpose from "weeding out"
unwanted medical malpractice claims to facilitating amicable, efficient
settlement of claims whenever possible. The goals of promoting quality
health care, promoting the physician-patient relationship, and protecting
the rights of injured patients should be incorporated into any mandatory
alternative dispute resolution technique. The goal of mandating a
resolution of disputes between parties should be left to our traditional
judicial system where our adversary system has developed to protect the
integrity of the fact-finding process.
Dennis J. Rasor
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APPENDIX
Chart A
States' Mandatory Medical Malpractice Screenine Panels
Salient Features of Screening Panels
State
Panel Me
HCP* [ AtyI I
AL2  13/3 1
AR' 1/3 1 1/3
Co 4  I I
Dal 12/5 I /5
FL' I I
GAP I I
Hi 1 1/3 1 1/3
ID" 1214 1 1/4
IL12 1 1/3 1 1/
N4 1 314 1114
LAU  I 3/4 I 1/4
ME 1" 1/3 I 1/
MD" 11/3 1 1/3
MA I 1/3 1 1/3
MP" 12/S 13/5
Mo2 12/6 12/6
MT2 1 316 1 3/6
NE" I 3/4 114
NV" 16 1 3/6
NI'7 1/3 1 1/3
NM" I 3/6 I 316
NY" 1 1/3 1 1/3
Np 12/5 1 !/5
OHM 13/3
PAM 1/3 1 1/3




WI"S 1215 1 115
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1. This column refers to the screening panel membership selection process. States have
many variations on panel selection. This chart notes affirmative party participation only
where parties are equally free to make choices from a substantial list of qualified individuals
or where parties are given unlimited or substantial peremptory challenges.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1976).
3. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (1976) (repealed 1989).
4. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-401 to -409 (1987) (Pilot district only).
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6802-6821 (1976).
6. This issue is not addressed in the statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
6812 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
7. Only if parties unanimously agree. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6805(2) (1989 &
Supp. 1992).
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (West 1975) (repealed 1983).
9. Fulton Super. Ct. Local R. 1000, repealed by Uniform Rules for the Superior
Courts, 1.1 (1985).
10. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 to -20 (1976 & Supp. 1992).
11. IOWA CODE §§ 6-1001 to -1011 (1976).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, par. 2-1012 to -1020 (1985) (repealed 1990).
13. This issue is not addressed in the statute. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1018(d) (1985) (repealed 1990).
14. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 to -10-5 (1975).
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1975) (amended 1991).
16. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-2859 (West 1992).
17. Retired judges only. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2852 (West 1992).
18. MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-03 to -09 (1976).
19. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 60B (1988).
20. The Massachusetts statute reads, "The testimony of said witness and the decision of
the tribunal shall be admissible as evidence at trial." Id. However, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that "decision" as used in the statute referred to the tribunals decision to
appoint an impartial expert witness. The determination of the tribunal was held to be
inadmissible. Beeter v. Downey, 442 N.E.2d 19 (1982). This interpretation of the statute
was driven by the Court's belief: "were such 'evidence' to be admitted and insulated from
further comment from either the trial judge or opposing counsel, however, the likelihood of
unfair prejudice flowing from this result might well reach constitutional limits." Id. at 22.
The Court rejected the argument that the legislature intended to make such evidence
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
21. This issue is not addressed in the statute. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 60B (1988).
22. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.4901 to .4923 (West 1987).
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 538 (Supp. 1976); see also State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979).
24. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-101 to -704 (1977).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840(2) (1976).
26. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41A.003 to .097 (Supp. 1991).
27. NJ. Civ. R. 4:21 (amended 1983) (deleted 1989); see also Marsello v. Barnett,
236 A.2d 869 (NJ. 1967); Dubler v. Stetser, 430 A.2d 962 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (admissibility of panel findings).
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27. NJ. Civ. R. 4:21 (amended 1983) (deleted 1989); see also Marsello v. Barnett,
236 A.2d 869 (NJ. 1967); Dubler v. Stetser, 430 A.2d 962 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (admissibility of panel findings).
28. Only if unanimous. NJ. Civ. R. 4:21-5 (amended 1983) (deleted 1989).
29. See also Carbo v. Crutchlow, 429 A.2d 547 (NJ. 1981) (stressing the importance
of having the ability to cross examine physician panelist at subsequent trial).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to -28 (Michie 1982).
31. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (Mclnney 1974) (repealed 1991).
32. Admissible only if panel is unanimous. Ild.
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1 (Supp. 1991); 1977 N.D. Laws 305, repealed by
1981 N.D. Laws 358.
34. The layperson member of the panel must represent health care consumers. 1977
N.D. Laws 305.
35. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Baldwin 1987).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 §§ 1301.308 to .604 (1975).
37. Only the panel conclusion as to liability is admissible at trial. The panel conclusion
as to damages is not admissible. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.510 (1975).
38. This issue is not addressed in the statute. Id.
39. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-19-1 to -7 (1981), repealed by 1985 R.I. Pub. Laws 150.
The Rhode Island procedure was unique. The screening panel's authority derived from the
justice of the Superior Court. The justice had original jurisdiction over all medical
malpractice claims and had discretion to appoint a screening panel. The panel reported its
findings directly to the justice for review. "if upon such review the court determines that the
findings of the panel that the plaintiff's case is an unfortunate medical result is supported by
the evidence adduced before the panel, the court shall dismiss the action with prejudice but
not otherwise.* R.I. GEN. LAWs § 10-19-6 (1981). The case only proceeds to trial if a
legitimate question of liability exists. Id.
40. Panel conclusion is only used by trial judge to determine whether to dismiss case,
similar to a summary judgment proceeding. Id.
41. This issue is not addressed in the statute. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-6 (1981).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-101 (1975) (repealed 1985).
43. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 7001-7009 (Supp. 1992).
44. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.12 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1993).
45. Wis. STAT. §§ 655.001 to .018 (1986).
46. Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-2-1501 to -1512 (1986).
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Chart B
State Sucren Courts' Conedtutional evew of Medical Malractice Screenlin Panel
State I Con.itudonal Theory
I [Y=Uonstioudon N=Conatfnional]
f[-) indicates that the court has not addressed this issue]




' I N N I N I N
Arizona- N - ! N I N
Colorado' N N I N I N
Delaware' I N N I N I N
Florida5  I N Y I N I -
Georka I N N I N I N
Wawaii? t N I -
Tdalo' N - N I
Iltinois' Y I - - I y
Tdiana I N N I N I N
Louisian" - N I N I -
Maryland' I N I N I N I N
Massachusetts I N N ! N I N
Mlchigan" I t - I -
Missouri' Y - I -
Montana"5  N I N I N I N
Nebraska"t  N I N N I -
New Tersev" N I N I N I -
New Mexico" N I N I N I N
New York* N I N I I
North Dakotaft I - I 1
Ohi I N I I N I -
Pennsylvania5J  I Y I I
Rhode tslandP - I - Y -
Tennessee; '  I -I I
VirmnWla'  N I - -
WisconinI N I N i N N
Wvonrine I - I Y I
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2. Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977).
3. Firelock, Inc. v. McGhee Comm., Inc., 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).
4. Lacyv. Green, 428 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1981).
5. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976) (holding statute in general to be
constitutional under right to trial by jury, due process and equal protection); Aldana v.
Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980) (holding application of mandatory medical malpractice
screening panel operated to deny due process of law).
6. Davis v. Gaona, 396 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1990).
7. Tobosa v. Owens, 741 P.2d 1280 (Haw. 1987).
8. Hawley v. Green, 788 P.2d 1321 (Idaho 1990); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555
P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976).
9. Wright v. Central DuPage Hasp. Ass'n. 347 N.E.2d 736 (M1. 1976). After Wight,
the legislature modified its mandatory screening panel in order to conform to the Illinois
Constitution as applied in Wright. However, the Illinois Supreme Court revisited the
constitutional issues under the new act and held it violated the Illinois Constitution under the
separation of powers doctrine. Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (11. 1986).
10. Johnsonv. St. Vincent Hasp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (End. 1980).
11. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
12. Attorney Gen. of Maryland v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57 (Md. 1978).
13. Paro v. Longwood Hasp., 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977); see also Kopycinski v.
Aserkoff, 573 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. 1991).
14. There has been no constitutional review by Michigan's courts of Michigan's
current mandatory screening panel per se. However, the courts have been divided on the
constitutionality of the bond requirement. Compare, Dunn v. Emergency Physicians Medical
Group, 437 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); and Knoke v. Micllin Chem. Corp., 470
N.W.2d 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
15. State t= rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hasp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1979).
16. Linderv. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187 (Mont. 1981).
17. Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977).
18. Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431 (NJ. 1983).
19. Otero v. Zouhar, 697 P.2d 493 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); rev'd on other grounds,
Otero v. Zouhar, 697 P.2d 482 (N.M. 1985).
20. In re Colten v. Riccobono, 496 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 1986) (due process); Treyball v.
Clark, 483 N.E.2d 1136 (N.Y. 1985) (due process and trial by jury).
21. North Dakota trial courts have held the screening panel act unconstitutional but the
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed all these decisions because of a lack of jurisdiction or
because the issues were not properly raised before the court. Ness v. St. Aloisius Hasp., 301
N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1981); Boedecker v. St. Alexius Hasp., 298 N.W.2d 372 (N.D. 1980);
Arnesonv. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
22. Beatty v. Akron City Hasp., 424 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1981).
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23. Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
24. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (hinting that the statute also violated
the state constitutional right to a jury trial).
25. For a discussion of state court review of Tennessee's first mandatory screening
panel procedure, see Robert L. Lockaby, Jr., Comment, Consdtaitonal Oallenges to
Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 TENN. L. REv. 607, 632 (1978-79). The
constitutionality of Tennessee's final version of the Medical Malpractice Review Board and
Claim Act was not reviewed before its repeal in 1985.
26. Speet v. Bacaj, 377 S.E.2d 397 (Va. 1989).
27. State t= rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978).
28. Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988).
